I. Some Necessary Background
The FTC enforces Section 5 of the FTC Act, which outlaws "unfair methods of competition," a phrase which is admittedly and intentionally vague. Sometimes it brings cases under both Section 5 and the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act, and sometimes only as standalone Section 5 cases. Section 1 of the Sherman Act in effect outlaws unreasonable agreements that restrain trade and Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which outlaws monopolization and attempted monopolization. The Clayton Act outlaws certain specified conduct, such as exclusive dealing.
The fact that there are also "standalone" complaints implies that the Unfair Methods of Competition phrase has a larger scope than the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act. Virtually everyone agrees with this, but there is little agreement on how far Section 5 extends beyond the Sherman and Clayton Acts. No internal guidelines and very little authoritative common law clarifies the potential reach of Section 5.
Except for merger injunction cases, which are usually brought in federal district court, most of the FTC cases are adjudicated before an Administrative Law Judge, whose findings may be appealed to the five Commissioners. It is the Commissioners, in the first place, who authorize the investigation and the issuance of a complaint. The Commissioners are both the prosecutor and the judge in the same case, an undeniable fact that can be argued to be unfair to defendants.
Commissioner Wright, for one, has argued, "The combination of institutional and procedural advantages with the vague nature of the Commission's Section 5 authority gives the agency the ability, in some cases, to elicit a settlement even though the conduct in question very likely may not be anticompetitive. give them a higher probability of making correct decisions than the Federal courts.
7. The 5-person Commission is bipartisan and usually tries to avoid 3-2 decisions, thus generating cases based on consensus, whereas there are countless plaintiffs' attorneys who on their own can decide to file a complaint.
8. Government lawyers tend to be more risk averse than plaintiffs' lawyers. The risky nature of contingent fee practice is premised on a small number of large victories, whereas the public expects that its law enforcement agencies will only bring cases with a high probability of winning. The point is not that the FTC never makes a mistake, but that it is perfectly natural to see carefully selected cases, developed in full hearings by expert Administrative Law Judges, ultimately upheld by the FTC, even without attributing any more bias than exists in generalist courts which too often have disdain for complex and long-lasting antitrust cases. 
III. The Challenge of Dual Enforcement
In the U.S., at the federal level there are two separate agencies that enforce the antitrust laws. This duality reflects history rather than logic, but as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote in his classic The Common Law, "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience."
The One recommendation was to formalize the industry-by-industry breakdown so that everyone could predict which agency would handle a particular merger. In the seven years since the report, no legislation has been generated, but the agencies have revised their clearance procedures and now apply a process that begins with the two agencies' litigation staffs negotiating, and then kicking it upstairs in steps, until the two agency heads get called in, if necessary, and negotiate an outcome. My impression is that this is working reasonably well. Each of the US antitrust agencies reflects a mix of organizational schemes, e.g., the FTC has multiple merger shops, each focusing on several specified sectors of the economy, and a number of other litigation shops that focus on certain violations without particular regard to industry.
Thus, the administrative problem of determining which unit will have prior claim on an incoming investigation may be common to all antitrust authorities, whether or not there is some form of dual enforcement.
B. Does the Outcome Depend on Which Agency Brings the Case?
History helps explain why there are two federal antitrust agencies. The Sherman Act was passed in 1890. The proposed bill seeks to eliminate any difference between the FTC and the DOJ in the processes for stopping a merger, its proponents asserting that the standard for a preliminary injunction is lower for the FTC than for the DOJ. Further, the bill would deprive the FTC of its authority to subject the merging parties to an administrative trial, on the assumption that this is more burdensome on the parties than a DOJ court proceeding. The bill would, first, make the preliminary injunction standard in Section 13(b) of the FTC Act inapplicable to mergers and, second, deprive the FTC of the ability to challenge mergers under Section 5 of the FTC Act. After one hundred years, should we be ready to eliminate the uniqueness of the FTC, thereby eliminating the justification for continuing a dual enforcement regime?
I will make two points. First, there are differences between an agency in which one person is empowered to make prosecution decisions and one in which a majority of a college of five equals makes decisions. This can be particularly important when dealing with changing, complex industries where the key requirement is judgment about the probability of future events, as is required in predicting the competitive effects of a merger or a merger remedy. I think that on balance the commission structure has an advantage.
Second, there are differences between a generalist court and a commission of experts. A generalist judge can usually bring to the court common sense and a keen ability to sort out what actually happened in the past from the testimony of witnesses. But most federal judges rarely try an antitrust case and are more likely to have prior experience in a prosecutor's office than in an economics classroom mastering the economics that is required in antitrust work. Most juries have far less relevant experience and there is reason to believe they do not even understand model jury instructions for civil antitrust cases. In short, the administrative process seems better suited to non-criminal antitrust matters than the standard federal district court route that must be taken by the DOJ. I see little reason to trade downward for the purpose of achieving an ideal 22 Letter to House of Representatives Judiciary Committee, April 9, 2014, http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/sites/default/files/AAI%20SMARTER%20Act%20Letter%204-9-2014%5B1%5D.pdf
